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THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S DECISION TO
DEFEND CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY RATHER
THAN THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT
Dawn Johnsen*
When President Barack Obama announced his view that the Defense of
Marriage Act1 (DOMA) violated the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection,2 he joined a storied line of Presidents who have acted upon their
own constitutional determinations in the absence of, and on rare occasion
contrary to, those of the U.S. Supreme Court. How best to proceed in the
face of a federal statute the President considers unconstitutional can involve
complex judgments, as was true of the difficult decision to enforce but not
defend DOMA. Ordinarily the Department of Justice should adhere to its
tradition of defending statutes against constitutional challenge, but I believe
that DOMA constituted a rare exception.
To defend DOMA’s
discrimination would have required making arguments that the Obama
Administration did not consider reasonable and that in their very making
would have exacerbated the constitutional harm to the equality and dignity
of Americans on the basis of sexual orientation. President Obama and
Attorney General Eric Holder acted appropriately and admirably in
choosing instead to present their actual views on sexual orientation
discrimination, just as their predecessors did on racial segregation, thereby
leaving DOMA’s defense to Congress and the ultimate resolution to the
courts.
Judicial review plays a familiar and central role in constitutional
interpretation: Supreme Court pronouncements on the constitutionality of
statutes dominate constitutional law as traditionally taught and understood.
But presidential review of legislation also can raise weighty questions. In a
prominent early example, President George Washington called upon his
* Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law, Indiana Maurer School of Law. I am grateful to
Richard Culbert and Kyle Fields for their excellent research assistance, to Marty Lederman
and Jeff Powell for helpful suggestions on this Essay, and to Walter Dellinger and other
Office of Legal Counsel colleagues (from my service there from 1993–1998) for their
inspirational examples of how to be an effective public lawyer.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28
U.S.C. § 1783C (2006)).
2. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House
of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Attorney General Letter], available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html (explaining the decision not to
defend DOMA).
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cabinet for advice on the constitutionality of a bill to establish a United
States bank.3 He ultimately signed the bill on the advice of Secretary of the
Treasury Alexander Hamilton and contrary to the views of Attorney
General Edmund Randolph and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson. The
Supreme Court upheld the law’s constitutionality in 1819,4 but a decade
later, President Andrew Jackson, disagreeing with both President
Washington and the Supreme Court, vetoed a bill to reauthorize the bank on
the grounds that he believed it was unconstitutional.5 In another example of
great consequence, President Jefferson suspended prosecutions and
pardoned those convicted under the Sedition Act of 1798 because he
believed the law violated the First Amendment, a position that may have
helped him to defeat incumbent President John Adams and his political
party to gain control of Congress.6
Then-congressional candidate Abraham Lincoln debated Stephen
Douglas on the extent to which an elected official should feel bound to
follow Dred Scott v. Sandford’s7 determination that the Missouri
Compromise was unconstitutional. After his election as President, Lincoln
and his Attorney General, as well as the Congress, did not consider
themselves bound to follow Dred Scott.8 President Andrew Johnson was
impeached by the House of Representatives (though acquitted by the
Senate) when he fired and replaced his Secretary of War without complying
with the requirements of a federal statute that he believed encroached
impermissibly upon his executive authority.9 Fifty years later, President
Johnson was vindicated. When President Woodrow Wilson similarly
3. See Daniel A. Farber, The Story of McCulloch: Banking on National Power, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 33 (Michael Dorf 2d ed. 2009).
4. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
5. See Farber, supra note 3, at 63.
6. Congress also declared its view that the law was unconstitutional and repaid all fines
paid under it. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 33–76
(2004) (discussing the Sedition Act’s enforcement and the debate over its constitutionality).
More than a century later, the Supreme Court wrote, “Although the Sedition Act was never
tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history.”
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
7. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
8. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS 575 (1978). President Lincoln also controversially suspended the writ of
habeas corpus at the outset of the Civil War when Congress was out of session, supported by
his Attorney General’s opinion that he possessed that power, and even more controversially,
refused to comply with Supreme Court Justice Taney’s order (acting as a Circuit judge) that
the government present a particular prisoner at a habeas hearing. See Ex parte Merryman, 17
F. Cas. 144, 146 (C.C.D. Md. 1861); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL 169–97 (1999) (reprinting and commenting upon relevant Attorney
General opinions); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the
Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 997–1009 (2008).
9. TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE SENATE
OF THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 6 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1868).
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refused to comply with statutory restrictions on his removal authority and
his Department of Justice argued against that statute’s constitutionality, the
Supreme Court agreed with the constitutional views of Presidents Wilson
and Johnson and held that such restrictions are unconstitutional.10
More recently, Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Herbert Walker
Bush both vigorously promoted their Administrations’ views on a range of
constitutional issues, including through litigation on behalf of the United
States and their judicial appointments.11 In one example especially relevant
to DOMA, President Bush’s acting Solicitor General, now-Chief Justice
John Roberts, refused to defend federal statutes that provided for the
consideration of race in order to benefit underrepresented minorities
seeking broadcast licenses.12 The Court rejected the Bush Administration’s
view and upheld the statute by a five–four vote, but after Bush-appointee
Clarence Thomas replaced Thurgood Marshall, the Court reversed its view,
also by a five–four vote.13 President George W. Bush elevated the issue of
executive power in the public eye by asserting the authority, in presidential
signing statements and once-secret opinions, to act contrary to statutory
limitations or to interpret them in sometimes questionable ways to avoid
alleged constitutional problems.14 Most (in)famously, President Bush’s
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) advised him that he could authorize torture
despite a federal statutory ban because, in OLC’s since-discredited view,
the statute unconstitutionally infringed on his Commander-in-Chief
authority in some circumstances.15 After the OLC opinion leaked,
President Bush dismissed that portion of the advice as unnecessary dicta,
but with regard to literally hundreds of other statutory provisions, his
Administration maintained that the President possessed the authority to
disregard or reinterpret statutes that conflicted with presidential authority,

10. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Presidents Jefferson, Jackson, and
Lincoln all offered strong statements in support of the President’s independent interpretive
authority, and President Johnson’s counsel in defending him before the Senate on the articles
of impeachment described the President’s authority to refuse to comply with laws he viewed
as unconstitutional in terms very similar to those adopted by modern Presidents and their
legal advisors. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally
Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 19–21 (2000).
11. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1988) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION IN 2000].
12. See Marty Lederman, John Roberts and the SG’s Refusal to Defend Federal Statutes
in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, BALKINIZATION (Sep. 8, 2005, 12:11 AM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/09/john-roberts-and-sgs-refusal-to-defend.html.
13. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600 (1990), overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
14. See generally Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a President to Do? Interpreting the
Constitution in the Wake of the Bush Administration’s Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395 (2008).
15. Memorandum from Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Re: Standards of
Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, to Alberto R. Gonzalez,
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memogonzales-aug2002.pdf.
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including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act’s warrant
requirement.16
Examples at this level of historic importance and controversy are
unusual, but the general issue of the proper scope of presidential
interpretive authority pervades government. When I served at OLC during
President Bill Clinton’s Administration, we often faced constitutionally
objectionable provisions in federal legislation. We were called upon both
before and after enactment in contexts that ranged from assisting in the
drafting of legislation and advising the President whether to veto a bill, to
interpreting legislation for a signing statement or implementing regulations,
to assessing the legality and propriety of refusing to enforce or defend an
unconstitutional provision. The view that typically has informed executive
branch practice across administrations, and that also prevails in academia,
regards the President’s interpretive authority as highly dependent on
context, including the particular power the President is exercising and the
positions of Congress and the Supreme Court.
To summarize, and at the risk of oversimplification, the President’s
responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”17 extends
to the Constitution, the “supreme Law of the Land,”18 as well as statutes.
But that does not resolve whose constitutional views should prevail when
the three branches do not all agree. The Supreme Court’s interpretive role
is “supreme” but not exclusive; the Court is not infallible (consider Dred
Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson19), but its constitutional interpretations merit
special regard from Congress and the President. Congress’s enactments are
presumptively constitutional and deserving of respect from the President
and the courts. Presidents generally should act on constitutional objections
to legislation before passage by working with Congress to cure defects or
by exercising the veto power the Constitution specially confers on the
President.
After enactment, Presidents ordinarily should enforce
constitutionally objectionable laws. They may continue to act upon their
constitutional concerns through the exercise of other authorities, including
by seeking legislative repeal, vetoing future bills, issuing pardons, or using
the presidential bully pulpit, even on the basis of constitutional views at
odds with those of the Court or Congress.
Neither past practice nor theory clearly answers whether President
Obama and his Attorney General Eric Holder made the optimal choice, or
even an appropriate one, once they reached the view that DOMA violated
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. I believe the question is
close, but that President Obama made the correct choice in deciding to
continue to comply with DOMA but not to defend it against constitutional
16. See Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws; President Cites Powers of
His Office, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at A1.
17. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
18. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
19. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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challenge, thereby requiring Congress to secure its own counsel if it desired
to defend the law.20 In changing course, he put his Administration on the
right side of history by refusing to fashion arguments that he and his top
legal advisors did not believe to be true in favor of discrimination against
persons based on their sexual orientation and against heightened judicial
scrutiny of such discrimination. To defend the federal statute and argue for
ordinary rational/reasonableness review in this extraordinary case would
have contributed to the continued exclusion from full and equal standing
under the law a category of persons who historically have been severely
disadvantaged on the basis of prejudice and stereotype. A President who so
views the case need not, indeed should not, urge the perpetuation of the
constitutional harm.
Of President Obama’s critics, Professor Daniel Meltzer has made the
strongest argument that Obama made the wrong choice.21 Professor
Meltzer served as President Obama’s principal deputy counsel and advised
on these very issues for some of the period during which the Department of
Justice defended DOMA and the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” statute that
excluded openly gay individuals from military service. I agree with much
of his analysis in support of a strong presumption in favor of defending
statutes, which generally is consistent with my previous writings and
experience, but not with his conclusion.
In 1994, while I worked at OLC, the Counsel to the President requested
an analysis of the principles that should govern the nonenforcement of
statutes on constitutional grounds. We endorsed and elaborated upon the
tradition of executive enforcement of constitutionally objectionable statutes
with only limited exceptions for statutes that are clearly unconstitutional or
that infringe on executive authority.22 On the distinct but related issue of
the defense of laws against constitutional challenge, the executive branch
typically follows roughly the same standard. Ordinarily the Department of
Justice defends even statutes its lawyers believe are unconstitutional, except
20. More specifically, the letter stated that the Department of Justice would argue that
heightened scrutiny should apply and DOMA cannot survive that close review, but if asked,
the Department would continue to argue that the law would satisfy rational basis review.
Attorney General Letter, supra note 2.
21. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183
(2012). Of my fellow panelists at this Symposium, my views are closest to Professor
Meltzer’s. See also Carlos A. Ball, When May a President Refuse to Defend a Statute? The
Obama Administration and DOMA, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 77 (2011), http://www.
law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/21/ (providing an excellent discussion of the
factors that should inform decisions whether to defend statutes, as applied to DOMA).
Another member of our panel, Professor and former Solicitor General Charles Fried,
criticizes the decision in far stronger terms. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The President’s
Courthouse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2011, at WK5 (noting that Fried found the decision
“unseemly, . . . pernicious,” and “‘an unbecoming, not to mention totally unconvincing, use
of excessive ingenuity in squirming out of an unpleasant duty’”).
22. Presidential Auth. to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C.
199, 201 (1994); see also Att’y Gen.’s Duty to Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, 5
Op. O.L.C. 25, 25 (1981).
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in two circumstances: a law that is so clearly unconstitutional that no
“reasonable argument” can be made in its defense, or a law that encroaches
on the President’s authorities. These seem to me the correct general
standards, appropriately respectful of both Congress’s lawmaking authority
and the judiciary’s special role in constitutional interpretation while
allowing for valuable executive participation in the debate about
constitutional meaning, typically through other mechanisms.23 The Obama
Administration’s approach to DOMA does not fit neatly into either of these
traditional exceptions. The law does not infringe upon executive authority
and reasonable arguments would seem available to defend its
constitutionality, though upon closer inspection and as discussed below, a
variation of the exception regarding reasonable arguments arguably applies
to this case.
Professor Saikrishna Prakash supports President Obama’s decision not to
defend, but on a very different theory that does not see this as an
extraordinary, close case, and that would have the President unilaterally
decline to enforce as well as defend DOMA—or any statute the President
believes is unconstitutional.24 Professor Prakash’s approach comports with
a well-developed minority view among academics who equate presidential
review of statutes with judicial review under a theory sometimes described
as departmentalism. Under a strong version of departmentalism, Presidents
are constitutionally obligated, not simply permitted, to decline to defend
and enforce any and all statutes they believe are unconstitutional.25 A vital
question generally left unaddressed is at what point and under what
circumstances should (or must) Presidents and their lawyers undertake
independent assessments of the constitutionality of statutes, in order to
determine when they are duty-bound to refuse to enforce or defend laws?
Also, at what point does the executive branch hold a sufficiently firm view
of a law’s constitutional infirmity to trigger the duties? Upon an OLC
determination reached in reviewing pending legislation that later passes? A
Solicitor General determination reached in the course of litigation? Or with
constitutional concerns voiced by the President in a signing statement? If
inadequate alone, do such concerns trigger a duty to elevate the question to
a full presidential review and ultimate presidential determination, regardless
of competing demands on the President’s time?

23. See generally Johnsen, supra note 10.
24. Professor Prakash, writing with Professor Neal Devins, argues that “there simply is
no duty to defend federal statutes the President believes are unconstitutional. . . . [T]here
likewise is no duty to enforce such laws. Given President Obama’s belief that the DOMA is
unconstitutional, he should neither enforce nor defend it.” Neal Devins & Saikrishna
Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 509 (2012) (citation
omitted); see also Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard
Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613 (2008).
25. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power
to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
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I believe a strong departmentalist view is inconsistent with the
constitutional structure and allocation of power, especially its “single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered procedure” for enacting laws, which
gives the President authority to veto a law he views as unconstitutional, but
Congress the authority to override a presidential veto.26 Routine unilateral
presidential nonenforcement would undermine Congress’s core power and
constitutionally preferred mechanisms for Presidents to promote their
constitutional views. Nor would this approach best serve the development
of constitutional meaning.27 Indeed, routine presidential nonenforcement
would be flatly inconsistent with governmental practice and our
constitutional tradition. So too would be an approach advocated at the other
extreme by some scholars and members of Congress—mandatory
enforcement and defense of all statutory provisions—which would
condemn virtually any presidential decision not to enforce or defend a law
as a usurpation of judicial or congressional authority. In an early influential
article entitled Presidential Review, Professor Frank Easterbrook described
an example of a clearly permissible nonenforcement that is particularly
relevant to the DOMA debate.28 Late in the 1970s, while Easterbrook
worked in the Solicitor General’s office, the Attorney General decided no
longer to enforce laws that discriminated on the basis of sex, because the
Court had made clear that similar laws violated the guarantee of equal
protection.29 Executive practice includes another generally accepted
circumstance for nonenforcement: federal statutes that encroach on
executive authority but would not be justiciable if the executive branch
invariably complied. Inflexible, mandatory enforcement and defense of
constitutionally objectionable laws thus also proves unworkable and
counter to practice and theory.
My previous writings address an intermediate approach I call “functional
departmentalism” and articulate guiding principles and a basis in
constitutional theory for what in the main actually has constituted
governmental practice.30 Presidents should act upon their independent

26. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
27. Johnsen, supra note 10, at 16–18, 25–29.
28. Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 913
(1990).
29. See id.
30. For a more thorough discussion of the principles and practices summarized in this
Essay, see Johnsen, supra note 10 (focusing on the Clinton Administration); Dawn E.
Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines
Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004); Johnsen, supra note 14
(focusing on the George W. Bush Administration). President George W. Bush was an
outlier in this regard, but even his extraordinary aggressiveness occurred in the context of
what he viewed as congressional encroachments on executive power, traditionally viewed by
Presidents as an area of enhanced authority. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 8, at 1095–
98; Dawn Johnsen, “The Essence of a Free Society”: The Executive Powers Legacy of
Justice Stevens and the Future of Foreign Affairs Deference, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 467, 501–
25 (2012). Other Presidents and their lawyers occasionally have used sweeping language to
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constitutional views only to the extent consistent with the constitutional
functions of Congress and the courts and only to the extent consistent with
the discernment and development of constitutional meaning (distinct from
simply the advancement of the President’s own views). Presidential review
thus requires respect for the constitutional functions and views of Congress
and the Court and careful attention to processes of executive interpretation
that will encourage principled, not inappropriately political and outcomedriven, legal interpretation.31
Constitutional concerns about
nonenforcement are significantly heightened when a President’s failure to
comply with a statute is not transparent even to Congress (as was true of
several post-9/11 instances) or when by not enforcing or complying with a
statute, the President renders a challenge to the law nonjusticiable, making
his own interpretation difficult to challenge. I previously have focused on a
functional analysis of presidential nonenforcement, but similar factors
should inform the less drastic response of nondefense. Professor Meltzer
helpfully elaborates on the functional concerns and values that support the
current presumption in favor of defending statutes: the protection of
Congress’s interests, institutional continuity, the relative competencies of
the branches of government, the relationships among the branches, and the
relationship within the executive branch between career lawyers and
political appointees.32
A functional, context-dependent analysis to my mind is correct as a
matter of theory, consistent with historical practice, and vital as a practical
matter. It can lead, however, to situations where the government takes
inconsistent positions with regard to the same legislation over time, and
even undermines its own litigating position. Professor Meltzer describes an
interesting example from the litigation of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
statute excluding gay individuals from military service under specified
circumstances.33 President Obama publicly stated his belief that the statute
“weakens our national security” and worked for its repeal on that basis, all
clearly within his authority.34 At the same time, his Department of Justice
defended the law against constitutional challenge, including on the grounds
describe the scope of presidential interpretive authority, but their actions were more
restrained.
31. See Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to Att’ys of the Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal
Advice and Written Opinions (July 16, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/
pdf/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf; WALTER E. DELLINGER, DAWN JOHNSEN ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL (2004), reprinted in Dawn E. Johnsen,
Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA
L. REV. 1559 app. 2 (2007).
32. Meltzer, supra note 21, at 1208–27; see also Drew S. Days III, In Search of the
Solicitor General’s Clients: A Drama with Many Characters, 83 KY. L.J. 485, 498–503
(1995) (describing the reasons for defense policy and Congress’s expanded capacity to
litigate on its own behalf since enactment of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978).
33. Meltzer, supra note 21, at 1233–34.
34. Id. at 1233.
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that Congress believed it strengthened national security, which led a district
court judge to insist that the government lawyers disavow one of the
seemingly inconsistent positions.35 I agree with Professor Meltzer that the
judge acted inappropriately here. Courts should accommodate the fact that
the different branches of government sometimes hold different
constitutional views and that in the context of defending a statute, the
Department of Justice typically will present not its best reading of the
Constitution, but all reasonable constitutional interpretations that support
the statute.
The Solicitor General has employed a few different approaches to this
dilemma, which is heightened in those rare cases in which the President has
personally determined and publicly announced that he believes a statutory
provision is unconstitutional. In the seminal campaign finance case Buckley
v. Valeo,36 Solicitor General Robert Bork filed two separate briefs, one
offering the best available defense of the law on behalf of the government,
and the other a more forthright expression of the views of the Attorney
General submitted as an amicus curiae.37 Oregon v. Mitchell38 is the only
case of which I am aware in which the Department of Justice defended a
statute after a sitting President publicly declared his view that it was
unconstitutional. There, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold defended a law
lowering the voting age to eighteen, because he believed reasonable
arguments could be made in its defense.39 At oral argument, however,
Griswold informed the Court that he and President Nixon believed the law
was unconstitutional, as Nixon had stated in his signing statement. In
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, President Bush’s acting Solicitor General
John Roberts argued that federal affirmative action policies mandated by
statute violated the guarantee of equal protection (notwithstanding the
existence of more-than-reasonable arguments to the contrary, which in fact
the Court adopted), but it allowed the Federal Communications
Commission to defend the policies.40
35. See id.
36. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
37. Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1082–83 (2001).
Robert Bork suggested that the Obama Administration should have considered this same
approach to DOMA and that the decision not to defend the law was an “outrage,” that
reveals the “utter cynicism and frivolity of the Obama administration.” Robert H. Bork,
Offense to the Constitution Act, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=7821.
38. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
39. See Waxman, supra note 37, at 1081–82. See generally Letter from Andrew Fois,
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Comm. on
the Judiciary (Mar. 22, 1996) (listing instances in which the government enforced, but did
not defend, laws that the President viewed as unconstitutional).
40. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
227 (1995). Professor Marty Lederman notes the unusual fact in this case that Presidents
Reagan and Bush had signed into law the minority preferences at issue without noting
constitutional objections to these provisions. Nor did they later publicly declare their view
that the provisions were unconstitutional. See Lederman, supra note 12. Professor Lederman
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When I served at OLC, occasionally another executive branch lawyer
would ask our office to tone down objections in a draft bill comment to
Congress, fearing that if the bill nevertheless passed, the Administration’s
public objections would make defense of the law more difficult. The bill
might even be one that the Administration strongly supported on policy
grounds, but that had been poorly drafted. OLC generally opposed
minimizing or omitting constitutional objections which might increase the
chance of the enactment of what we considered an unconstitutional
provision, in order to improve the Department of Justice’s ability later to
defend an unconstitutional provision that should not have been enacted in
the first place.41 The government’s objective is not simply to prevail in
court. As an inscription on the wall outside the Attorney General’s office
reads, “The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens
in the courts.”42
The precedent most relevant to DOMA from my time at OLC involved a
1996 bill that directed the President to discharge any member of the
military who tested HIV positive, regardless of the service member’s actual
ability to serve.43 President Clinton, on the advice of his lawyers and
military advisors, personally determined that this provision was
unconstitutional and that it was motivated by prejudice against HIVpositive individuals.44 Supporting the President’s belief were highly
offensive statements by the provision’s sponsor and the fact that Congress
had not engaged in any genuine consideration of this specific provision.45
The veto power seems an obvious potential safeguard but, as often can be
the case, the HIV-discharge provision comprised just one part of legislation
with numerous provisions—in this case a particularly important omnibus
bill, the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 (NDAA).46
correctly views a presidential determination as appropriate in such cases. See id. Although it
was not express in the case of Metro Broadcasting, it almost certainly existed, because
opposition to affirmative action was a central component of the “Reagan revolution.” See
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND
ACCOUNT 90 (1991).
41. Best practices can be complicated, as, for example, when Congress enacts provisions
that the Court essentially has declared unconstitutional in reviewing similar statutes. One
prominent example involves Congress’s continued inclusion of “legislative vetoes” in some
multiprovision bills, which the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983), and which Presidents therefore routinely assert the authority to
disregard (as Congress expects they will).
42. E.g., Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Dep’t Prosecutors
(Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo.html.
43. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106,
§ 567, 110 Stat. 186, repealed by Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. II,
§ 2707(a)(1), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–30 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1177 (Supp. IV
1998)); see also United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
44. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996,
1 PUB. PAPERS 226, 227 (1996) [hereinafter Statement on Signing], available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=52387.
45. Johnsen, supra note 10, at 57.
46. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 § 567.
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Nonetheless, President Clinton did veto the bill, citing concerns about the
HIV-discharge provision (though not expressed in constitutional terms) and
several other provisions.47 Congress then passed a version of the NDAA
that addressed some of his concerns but retained the HIV-discharge
provision.48 President Clinton felt that he could not afford a second veto
because the larger defense bill served vital and pressing needs.49 After a
careful and extensive review by his legal and military experts, the President
personally determined that justice would best be served by urging Congress
to repeal the provision and notifying Congress that his Administration
would enforce but not defend it in litigation.50 In the end, under the
pressure of having to defend the provision itself, Congress repealed it
before its effective date.51
To my mind, the HIV-discharge provision presented a rare example of an
appropriate deviation from practice, where the President acted within his
authority in enforcing but not defending a law he personally thought
unconstitutional even though the provision did not fall within one of the
traditional exceptions.52 Several important factors supported this deviation
from the norm, which essentially relate to the value the President could
bring to the Court’s ultimate constitutional analysis: the President’s
strongly held and carefully deliberated constitutional view informed by
military and legal experts; the President’s special role as Commander in
Chief; the likelihood that courts otherwise would underenforce the equal
protection norms at stake under a deferential rational basis review; the
potential devastating harm to those individuals affected; the fact that
Congress had not considered the provision’s constitutionality; and the
impermissible motivation behind the law as evidenced by the sponsor’s
offensive statements. Even more than for DOMA, the HIV-discharge
provision would have provided strong precedent if the Obama
Administration had elected to enforce, but not defend, the “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” exclusion from military service based on sexual orientation,
which it instead defended while successfully working with Congress for its
December 2010 repeal. Thus, with regard to both the HIV-discharge and
the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” provisions, Presidents succeeded in achieving

47. See Veto Message, H.R. DOC. NO. 104-155 (1995), reprinted in 142 CONG. REC.
H12 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1996).
48. See Statement on Signing, supra note 44.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. II § 2707(a)(1), 110 Stat. 1321–30.
52. Johnsen, supra note 10, at 13–14, 52–60. I identified and applied to the HIVdischarge example six factors to assist in making nonenforcement and nondefense decisions:
the clarity of the constitutional defect; the relative interpretive competencies of the three
branches; whether Congress actually considered the constitutional issue; the effect
nonenforcement might have on the likelihood of judicial review; the severity of the
constitutional harm; and the possibility of legislative repeal as an effective alternative to
nonenforcement.
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the constitutionally superior course of persuading Congress to repeal laws
the Presidents had determined were unconstitutional.
Where repeal is not feasible—or while repeal efforts are underway, as in
the case of DOMA and the HIV-discharge provision—nondefense
ordinarily is preferable to nonenforcement as a constitutional matter. A
decision not to defend a law raises vital questions of judgment, but not of
potential constitutional transgression. Some of President Obama’s critics
confuse and conflate the two. Newt Gingrich and Glenn Beck, for example,
falsely attacked President Obama for refusing to enforce DOMA, with
Gingrich even raising the possibility of impeachment.53 House Speaker
John Boehner similarly objected, stating that “[t]he constitutionality of this
law should be determined by the courts—not by the president
unilaterally.”54 Speaker Boehner’s complaint would have had merit if
President Obama actually had “unilaterally” refused to enforce DOMA; if
he had provided the plaintiffs the benefits they sought, he might have
effectively ended the litigation and the judiciary’s opportunity to resolve the
constitutional question.55 Instead, President Obama chose to enforce the
law and present his constitutional views in litigation, which allows the
53. See Jim Meyers & Ashley Martella, Gingrich: If Palin Took Obama Actions, There
Would Be Calls for Impeachment, NEWSMAX (July 17, 2012, 4:43 PM), http://
www.newsmax.com/Headline/Gingrich-Obama-Constitutional-Crisis/2011/02/25/id/387455/
(noting that Gingrich stated that it is the President’s job to “enforce the rule of law” and that
if Sarah Palin had refused to enforce the laws of the United States that there would have
been calls for her impeachment); Beck Falsely Claims Obama Won’t Enforce Law on
DOMA; Adds, “He Has Made Congress Irrelevent” [sic], MEDIA MATTERS (Feb. 25, 2011),
http://www.mediamatters.org/video/2011/02/25/beck-falsely-claims-obama-wont-enforcelaw-on-d/176907 (providing recording of Beck stating that “[President Obama] says that he
is not going to enforce [DOMA]”).
54. Press Release, John Boehner, Speaker, House of Representatives, Statement by
House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) Regarding the Defense of Marriage Act (Mar. 4,
2011), available at http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/statement-house-speaker-johnboehner-r-oh-regarding-defense-marriage-act.
55. A federal district court already had found the law unconstitutional, so the Obama
Administration would not have been entirely without judicial support. See Gill v. Office of
Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010). Several other district courts since then
have declared DOMA unconstitutional, as have the First and Second Circuits. See Windsor
v. United States, Nos. 12-2335-cv(L), 12-2435(Con.), 2012 WL 4937310 (2d Cir. Oct. 18,
2012), aff’g 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), petition for cert. before judgment filed,
No. 12-63 (U.S. July 16, 2012), petition for cert. before judgment filed, No. 12-307 (U.S.
Sept. 11, 2012); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2012), petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 12-13 (U.S. June 29, 2012), 12-15 (U.S. July 3, 2012),
and 12-97 (U.S. July 20, 2012); Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 3:10-cv-1750, 2012
WL 3113883, at *1, (D. Conn. July 31, 2012), appeal docketed, No. 12-3273 (2d Cir. filed
Aug. 17, 2012), petition for cert. before judgment pending, No. 12-231 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2012),
petition for cert. before judgment pending, No. 12-302 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2012); Dragovich v.
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. C 10-1564 CW, 2012 WL 1909603 (N.D. Cal. May 24,
2012), appeal docketed, No. 12-16461 (9th Cir. June 26, 2012), and No. 12-16628 (9th Cir.
July 23, 2012); Golinski v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012),
appeal docketed, No. 12-15388 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 2012), and No. 12-15409 (9th Cir. Feb. 28,
2012), petition for cert. before judgment pending, No. 12-16 (U.S. July 3, 2012).
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courts, not the President, to decide DOMA’s fate. Another significant
distinction is the transparency inherent in the nature of nondefense, which
unlike nonenforcement does not allow Presidents to act secretively. The
Department of Justice, Congress, and the parties to the litigation all may
present their competing arguments in open court with public resolution in
the form of a judicial opinion.56
Attorney General Holder’s letter properly frames the decision not to
defend DOMA as a “rare” exception to the traditional presumption.57 The
letter conveys that the President and the Attorney General appreciate the
difficulty and gravity of their decision, and that far more is at stake than
whether a reasonable argument can be made in defense of one particular
statute.
The litigation compelled the Department of Justice—and given the
fundamental nature and political prominence of the issue, President Obama
himself—to formulate a position on how courts generally should evaluate
claims of unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
As the letter explains, the litigation previously had occurred only in
jurisdictions where circuit courts already had adopted rational basis review,
allowing the Department to apply that standard without evaluating or
endorsing it. That approach, however, became untenable when plaintiffs
filed suit challenging DOMA’s constitutionality in a circuit that had not
previously adopted a standard of review.
Far from a technical doctrinal question, the standard of review the
Supreme Court ultimately settles upon for sexual orientation discrimination
may have far-reaching implications for numerous statutes and other
discriminatory actions at all levels of government. The Court has chosen to
approach claims of equal protection violations by putting great, usually
dispositive, emphasis on the standard of review. Rational basis review
typically means the government is free to use a characteristic as it wishes,
even to the great detriment of those adversely affected, while heightened
scrutiny lifts the usual veil of deference in favor of close judicial review of
the proffered justifications for the discrimination.
The standard of review profoundly affects how the defense of a statute
may proceed. The Administration had been defending the law based on
hypothetical justifications, as rational basis review permits but as
heightened scrutiny would not allow. Heightened scrutiny would require
the government to rest its defense solely on the actual purposes behind the
statute. The Department of Justice already had abandoned defending
DOMA based on its actual purposes because they reflected impermissible
56. See generally Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914 (2012)
(arguing that Congress should take a more active role in litigation including in defense of its
statutes).
57. Attorney General Letter, supra note 2. During his confirmation hearing, Holder put
it well in stating that overcoming the presumption requires a “very compelling reason.”
Liptak, supra note 21.
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prejudice, including the since-discredited view that children who are raised
by gay and lesbian parents suffer harm as a result.
On the merits, the Attorney General’s letter argues, in my view
convincingly, that heightened scrutiny is the appropriate standard, and that
DOMA’s “legislative record . . . undermines any defense under heightened
scrutiny.”58 But as the letter acknowledges, the traditional policy calls for
defense on a low threshold, whenever reasonable arguments are available.
The Attorney General makes essentially two brief points in a single
paragraph to support its determination that “[t]his is the rare case where the
proper course is to forgo the defense of this statute.”59 One point simply
notes the applicability of former Solicitor General Seth Waxman’s
observation that the Department previously has declined to defend statutes
“in cases in which it is manifest that the President has concluded that the
statute is unconstitutional.”60 The more complicated point in support draws
a distinction between “professionally responsible” arguments and
“reasonable” arguments, which, though cryptic, raises the possibility that
DOMA falls within a variation of the traditional no-reasonable-argument
exception.61 With regard to the actual purposes behind DOMA’s 1996
enactment, the Administration persuasively argues that they reflect
impermissible prejudice that should not be proffered as reasonable
arguments in 2011 and beyond. While 1996 is quite recent, since then our
nation’s understanding of sexual orientation discrimination and what passes
as a reasonable justification has changed significantly. If the correct
standard of review is heightened scrutiny, then the Department seems
justified in declining to defend DOMA based on arguments from actual
purposes that it does not find reasonable.62
58. Attorney General Letter, supra note 2.
59. Id.
60. Id. An extended version of the quote is helpful: “[E]ven when neither exception
applies, the Department of Justice has occasionally declined to make professionally
respectable arguments, even when available, to defend a statute—typically, in cases in which
it is manifest that the President has concluded that the statute is unconstitutional.” Waxman,
supra note 37, at 1083.
61. Attorney General Letter, supra note 2 (“[T]he Department has a longstanding
practice of defending the constitutionality of duly-enacted statutes if reasonable arguments
can be made in their defense . . . . However, the Department in the past has declined to
defend statutes despite the availability of professionally responsible arguments, in part
because the Department does not consider every plausible argument to be a ‘reasonable’
one.”).
62. This would seem true as well under the heightened form of rational basis review the
Court occasionally has applied where it determines the actual purpose behind a statute was
“a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group.” U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). The First Circuit relied on these cases
and this reasoning to find DOMA unconstitutional. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 10–12 (1st Cir. 2012), aff’g Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F.
Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), and Massachusetts. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010), petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 12-13 (U.S. June 29,
2012), 12-15 (U.S. July 3, 2012), and 12-97 (U.S. July 20, 2012). The Attorney General’s
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The more difficult question is whether the Department of Justice can (and
must) make reasonable arguments that sexual orientation discrimination
should not be subject to heightened judicial review (and therefore DOMA
need not be justified by the law’s actual purposes). The letter suggests that
although professionally responsible arguments could be crafted, the
Department does not consider the arguments, which the President
affirmatively has rejected, to be reasonable.63 Thus, the question at hand is
whether the Department must make plausible arguments against heightened
scrutiny that it views as unreasonable, perhaps even offensive, and that the
President personally has determined are wrong, or whether it may instead
present the courts with what the President and the Attorney General believe
to be the proper constitutional analysis.
One important factor, which the letter does not address other than to label
the case “rare,” is how broad a precedent the decision not to defend DOMA
sets. For example, if a President has publicly stated his belief that the
Affordable Care Act is beyond Congress’s authority to enact, does the
DOMA example suggest the Department of Justice should not defend the
Act? What if a President has declared his view that statutory restrictions on
the purchase of guns violate the Second Amendment? Deserving of special
consideration among Professor Meltzer’s concerns is the risk that the
DOMA decision, far from remaining “rare,” will presage a practice of
Presidents and their Attorneys General declining to defend controversial
statutes and an inappropriate politicization of constitutional interpretation,
with Presidents regularly lobbied to take constitutional positions and
impose them on the Department of Justice.64
History provides some reassurance. The Department of Justice has
declined to defend statutes on a number of occasions, especially when
Presidents have concluded the statutes are unconstitutional. With the
notable exception of Oregon v. Mitchell,65 it seems that Presidents typically
have presented their actual views to courts whenever they felt sufficiently
strongly about an issue. And yet the traditional presumption in favor of
letter does not directly address this possibility, but it does cite Cleburne for the general
factors that guide the Court’s determination whether heightened scrutiny is appropriate.
Attorney General Letter, supra note 2.
63. See Attorney General Letter, supra note 2.
64. See Meltzer, supra note 21, at 1227–32. This is not to suggest a simplistic view that
politics should, or could, play no role, or that lobbying is improper. Professor Jeff Powell
has written an enlightening essay on the inherent complexities for public lawyers seeking to
maintain “loyalty to the law” given that “[p]olitics is inseparable from public lawyering,” but
“public lawyering is not simply politics.” H. Jefferson Powell, Loyalty to the Law: Politics
in the Practice of Public Lawyering in the United States, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 78, 86
(1996). To the extent that “politics” and lobbying played a role in the Obama
Administration’s position on DOMA, those influences are complex and not necessarily
inappropriate. Social movements in the United States have informed and enriched
constitutional understanding, especially regarding the meaning of equal protection. See, e.g.,
Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement
Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 307–16 (2001).
65. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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defense remains strong. The high-profile DOMA example nonetheless
might encourage a weakening of the tradition and nondefense decisions
lacking in legal integrity. Vigilance and care are warranted in order
properly to cabin the DOMA precedent’s meaning and reach, beyond the
brief explanation provided by the Attorney General.
One safeguard would be to consider a presidential determination of the
constitutional question a necessary condition for nondefense in all but the
clearest of cases. Although extremely helpful, a presidential finding seems
to me insufficient alone to justify deviation from the traditional
presumption in favor of defense of statutes. Nor should Presidents
undertake an independent review of challenged statutes as a matter of
course; the practice of presuming the constitutionality of statutes and
leaving their defense to the Department of Justice should continue.
In any event, the Obama Administration’s nondefense of DOMA should
not be interpreted as precedent for Presidents to decline to defend wholly
dissimilar laws, such as the Affordable Care Act or gun restrictions.66
Rather, the nondefense of DOMA is consistent with executive branch
precedent in a discrete category of historic cases involving the fundamental
meaning of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. It can be
viewed as supporting only cases in which the President personally believes
a statute invidiously discriminates on the basis of a characteristic that
warrants heightened judicial protection, and additionally where any
professionally responsible argument in the law’s defense is unreasonable
and objectionable on the very grounds that the law’s discrimination is
objectionable. Here, the President and the Attorney General concluded that,
in light of the factors the Supreme Court has identified as informing the
appropriate standard of review, the professionally responsible arguments
purportedly available were not in fact “reasonable.” Indeed, if made, they
might contribute to the very constitutional violation alleged.
As detailed in the Attorney General’s letter, the arguments in favor of
rational basis review, and against heightened scrutiny, would have to
include the following: the history of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is inadequate to justify judicial protection; sexual orientation is
not immutable; the LGBT community possesses adequate political power
not to need judicial protection; or sexual orientation discrimination is
legitimately related to societal objectives.67 In fact, the President and the
Attorney General have determined based on these very factors that sexual
orientation discrimination historically has operated to deny persons the
equal protection of the laws. To argue to the contrary in support of DOMA

66. The proper response would depend upon whether a compelling reason existed for
overcoming the strong presumption to the contrary, including by weighing what the
President might contribute to the debate against the considerable functional costs of going
beyond the two traditional exceptions.
67. See Attorney General Letter, supra note 2.
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would perpetuate that exclusion from equal legal standing and full
citizenship.
More fundamentally, and framing the Obama Administration’s response
to DOMA slightly more broadly, I believe that a President may instead
choose to tell the public and the courts what he actually believes to be true
about the constitutional status of sexual orientation discrimination, one of
the great defining civil rights issues of our day. A President may contribute
to what he views as a rare and historic moment of advancement in the
Court’s understanding of constitutional equality for a disadvantaged group
rather than defend a particular instance of discrimination against that group.
The President, as the single nationally elected representative, is a
particularly valuable participant in this historic constitutional debate about
the meaning of equality in the United States—in a sense, about who
constitutes “We the People.”
Former Solicitor General Seth Waxman’s description of the special role
played by the Solicitor General in the protection of civil rights provides
strong historical support for a narrow civil rights rationale in favor of the
President’s decision not to defend DOMA.68 Waxman traces this special
role back to the creation of the Solicitor General’s office in 1870.69 In his
article entitled Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor
General, he writes of “the undeniable civil rights subtext for creation of the
office, the consequent special responsibility many Solicitors General have
felt for civil rights litigation, and the contribution they have made to the
development of this unique area of law.”70 Most famously, the Solicitor
General argued for the overruling of Plessy v. Ferguson in Brown v. Board
of Education71 and even earlier argued against the constitutionality of racial
discrimination and segregation.72 The Solicitor General took this position
even though it jeopardized the chances the Court would uphold a federal
law segregating the schools in the District of Columbia.73 In fact, the Court
relied on Brown to invalidate that federal law in Bolling v. Sharpe under
what it described as the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of Due Process, an outcome to which the
Department of Justice directly contributed.74 Later, the Department
68. See Seth P. Waxman, Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor
General, 75 IND. L.J. 1297 (2000).
69. Id. at 1297.
70. Id. at 1313.
71. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
72. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for
Higher Ed., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see also RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975) (discussing the Department of Justice’s role in
Brown and its predecessors).
73. Waxman, supra note 68, at 1307–09.
74. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The Department of Justice argued that if the
relevant statute were interpreted to require segregation in the District of Columbia’s public
schools, “a grave and difficult question under the Fifth Amendment would arise,” and
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declined to defend—and intervened to challenge—the constitutionality of a
statute that provided federal funding to hospitals that discriminated on the
basis of race, notwithstanding the availability of an argument that the
discrimination was not the result of state action.75
The Bush
Administration’s attack on the constitutionality of affirmative action
statutes also can be seen as precedent for a special role for the executive
branch in participating in the debate over the meaning of equal protection—
although, to my mind, in pursuit of an erroneous interpretation.76
Six decades ago, the Solicitor General chose to play a leading role in
urging the Court to declare race discrimination constitutionally suspect.
Two decades later, another civil rights issue emerged: whether heightened
judicial scrutiny should protect women from sex discrimination. Presidents
Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford and their Solicitors General did not play the
same seminal role in the development of constitutional protection against
sex discrimination. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg at the time
served as an attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union, and she later
noted that the Solicitor General unintentionally provided her with a
“treasure trove” for future litigation: a long list of discriminatory statutes
appended to a petition for certiorari by which the government sought to
demonstrate the high stakes if the Court did not take the case and uphold
the discriminatory law at issue.77
The Department of Justice’s initial strenuous opposition to meaningful
constitutional protection for women’s equality wavered after the Court in
1971 began rejecting the Department’s defense of discriminatory federal
benefit laws78 and particularly after a four-Justice plurality in 1973
endorsed heightened scrutiny for sex discrimination79 (a majority adopted
intermediate scrutiny in 1976).80 Solicitor General Robert Bork filed an
amicus curiae brief in 1973 stating, “It is now settled that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (like the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth) does not tolerate discrimination on the basis of sex.”81
The brief went further and argued that exclusion from employment on the
basis of pregnancy constitutes sex discrimination prohibited by the equal
therefore the law should be interpreted to avoid that constitutional problem. Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 8,
101, 191, 413, and 448).
75. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
76. See supra note 40.
77. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for the Celebration of 75 Years of Women’s
Enrollment at Columbia Law School, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (2002) (discussing
Appendix E to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Moritz, 469 F.2d. 466 (1972)).
78. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
79. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
80. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
81. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (No. 72-777) and Cohen v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., 411
U.S. 947 (1973) (No. 72-1129).
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protection clause82—a position that the Court would reject the next year and
still has not accepted.83 In 1975, however, Solicitor General Bork returned
to the full-throated defense of a federal law that denied equal benefits to
men, a defense the Court unanimously rejected in Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld.84 Professor Cary Franklin writes convincingly that “[o]ne of
the chief obstacles Ginsburg confronted in [Weinberger] was the incredulity
and discomfort Wiesenfeld’s desire for ‘mother’s benefits’ aroused in the
government’s lawyers,”85 who sought to impugn his masculinity and his
motives for wanting to stay home and care for his baby after his wife died
in childbirth.86
One can imagine a counterfactual history in which in 1975 the President
together with his Attorney General and Solicitor General had been
persuaded by ACLU attorney Ginsburg’s arguments and judicial victories
that sex discrimination should trigger heightened scrutiny. The precedent
of executive branch leadership against race discrimination would have
supported a decision to enforce but not to defend the decades-old
discriminatory laws that reflected and perpetuated stereotypes about
women’s proper place being in the home and not in the workplace, and men
not belonging in the home caring for their young children.87 In 1995, the
Department of Justice did choose to take a leadership role and urged the
Court to increase the constitutional protection afforded to women by
applying strict rather than intermediate scrutiny, in a case involving the
exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute,88 even though
strict judicial scrutiny would make more difficult the future defense of
discriminatory federal laws.89
Race discrimination and sex discrimination provide the proper analogies
for the DOMA decision. Today, a central civil rights question is the

82. See id. at 16.
83. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494–97 (1974).
84. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
85. Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination
Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV 83, 133 (2010).
86. Id. at 132–42. Professor Franklin describes how Ginsburg effectively turned around
the case and “cited [Solicitor General] Bork’s conjectures about her client as a prime
example of how sex stereotyping worked.” Id. at 135.
87. On the other hand, a 2012 Supreme Court decision illustrates that the Solicitor
General should take care that it does not too easily abandon defense of a statute that
advances equality. In that case, the Solicitor General declined to defend a provision of the
Family and Medical Leave Act that four dissenting justices ultimately voted to uphold as
within Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to deter and
remedy sex discrimination. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327
(2012).
88. Brief for the Petitioner at 36, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1995) (No. 941941).
89. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53 (2001)
(upholding a federal statute, defended by the Department of Justice, that afforded a child
citizenship in a manner that discriminated based on whether the citizen parent was the
child’s mother or father).
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judiciary’s role in protecting against discrimination based on sexual
orientation, a characteristic that the government historically has used to
disadvantage and stigmatize individuals in their public and private lives—
from military service, to custody of their own children, to sexual intimacy
and marriage to their chosen life partner. President Obama properly and
admirably has chosen to take part in this historic constitutional debate,
thereby providing a valuable perspective while leaving the resolution of the
dispute over DOMA’s constitutionality to the Supreme Court.
President Obama’s decision not to defend DOMA is based on a narrow
and fundamental ground. The level of judicial scrutiny appropriate for
discrimination against a historically disadvantaged group is an issue of
cross-cutting importance about which the President need not make
arguments that he finds unreasonable and offensive, arguments that
themselves would exacerbate constitutionally cognizable harm. Instead,
President Obama and his Department of Justice should tell the Court what
they actually believe is the nation’s correct path forward, toward true equal
protection of the laws and an end to stigmatization and exclusion based on
sexual orientation.

